Population Reference Bureau Statistics, 2000 Report
•Iran’s population increases from34 million in 1976 to nearly 50 million in 1986, with avg. growth rate of 3.9% a year
•Between 1986 and 1996 the population growth rate was 2% a year
•As of 2000, the growth rate was estimated at 1.2%
•Between 1976 and 2000 Iran’s fertility rate declined from 5.6 births per women to 2.0 births (In rural areas the birth rate went from 8.1 to 2.4, and in urban from 4.5 to 1.8)
•In 2000 74% of married women practiced family planning
•In 1976 37% of married women practiced family planning
•Women’s average age at marriage increased from 1976 to 2996 from 19.7 years of age to 22.4 years of age
•1986 census showed Iran’s population ate close to 50 million with a growth rate of over 3%
•As of 2000, 16,000 health houses in Iran serving 95% of the rural population
•Each health house serves on average 1500 patients
•In the year 2000 the government provided 75% of all family planning services (91% rural, 67% urban)
•In 2000 in Tehran, 82% of women use contraceptives
•In 2000 77% of rural and 94% of urban households has televisions
•Between 1976 to 1996 female literacy rate increased from 17% to 62%
•In 2000 female literacy rate was over 75%
•Secondary school enrollment for girls doubled in 1980’s from 36% to 72%
•In 2000 more women entered universities than men
•Maternal deaths due to pregnancy and childbirth declined from 140 per one hundred thousand live births in 1985 to 37 in 1996
•In 2000 more than 90% of pregnant women receive two prenatal check ups
•In 2000 95% of births are attended by a doctor or trained midwife
•Between 1985 and 1996 child mortality (under five years) dropped from 70 to 33 per 1,000 live births
•Between 1985 to 1996 the infant mortality rate declined from 51 to 26 per 1,000 live births
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Reading Notes on "Sex and Society in Islam" by B.F Musallam
Musallam, B.F. “Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control Before the Nineteenth Century.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1983.
In “Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control Before the Nineteenth Century” B.F Musallam writes of the history and Islamic justifications for birth control and family planning in Islamic societies. Unlike the ancient Judaism and Christianity, medieval Islam did not forbid birth control as infanticide. Central to understanding birth control and family planning within Islam is an understanding of these Islamic justifications. The justification of birth control in Islam centered on a few important concepts.
First, the concept of “God’s infinite power” was used to justify the most commonly used method “coitus interruptus” (26). Accidental pregnancies that resulted from coitus interupptus were regarded as evidence of God’s all-powerful will—they proved that “when God wanted a child to be born, he was.” (26). Thus birth control was not regarded as infanticide, for if God wanted an infant he would be born, regardless what methods of birth control were employed (or attempted, rather). Additionally, the use of coitus interruptus has been documented in the Hadith. Mohammed is said to have practiced coitus interruptus and encouraged his followers to practice the method with women (often slaves) they did not wish to impregnate (15).
Interestingly, the prophet forbade the practice of coitus interruptus “with a free woman except with her permission” (16). Thus in accordance with the hadith, Islam requires a woman’s consent to practice coitus interruptus. Muslim scholars believed the woman is entitled to both sexual gratification and children—coitus interruptus without her permission is said to deny her of these (28).
Second, ancient Muslim scholars utilized both current medical and social knowledge to justify birth control and family planning. They believed that birth control could improve the well being of children. It was believed that a new pregnancy would almost certainly lead to death of a newborn infant (due to lack of breast milk, nutrition, etc). Birth control and family planning could improve the chances of those children that were already born. Additionally, ancient Muslims acknowledged that effective family planning could improve educational opportunities for children. Muslim scholar Bujairimi stated that “if contraception is practiced for an excuse, such as the raising of a child, it is not even blameworthy” (25). Thus, medieval Islam recognized the economic and social pressures put on large families, through that recognition justified birth control.
Finally, unlike in Christianity and Judaism the spilling of semen is not considered the spilling of God’s seed. Muslim scholars believed that both male and female semen were required for creation of life and both were believed (by many, including Ibyn Qayyim) to be equal in quality and value. It was believed that “the man’s semen is thick and forms the bones and tendomes. The woman’s semen is fine and forms the flesh and the blood” (52). Once life was generated ensoulment was believed to take one hundred twenty days. Thus, with both male and female contributions necessary to generate life and one hundred twenty days necessary , coitus interruptus did not carry the moral weight that it did in medieval Christianity and Judaism.
B.F Musallam continues to describe the various potions and herbs used in ancient Islamic societies as methods of birth control. He notes that only a small fraction of the described methods were “irrational” and claims that the early Islamic acceptance of birth control was related to relatively large body of scientific and medical knowledge on birth control available at the time.
Reflections
This book really helped me make sense of everything in my mind—now that I understand the ancient Islamic justifications for birth control it is easier to understand the modern justifications for birth control in the Islamic republic of Iran. I am impressed with the large body of scientific and medical knowledge available at that time and impressed Islam’s incorporation of that knowledge. I also find it interesting that Islam differed so widely from Christianity and Judaism in this regard (while I understand their religious justifications). Finally, I am surprised and impressed that a woman’s consent is required to practice coitus interruptus. This sort of goes against the modern stereotype of Muslim women as oppressed or without voice or rights; I think the belief in women’s right to sexual gratification would surprise many other people who are not familiar with Islam and Islamic family planning practices.
In writing my paper I see this book and my reading notes being a useful tool for analysis. Perhaps it would be wise to write my paper chronologically, starting with a the system before the revolution, documenting the changes after the revolution, and using data from this book to help analyze the justifications for why these changes/this new system was made.
In “Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control Before the Nineteenth Century” B.F Musallam writes of the history and Islamic justifications for birth control and family planning in Islamic societies. Unlike the ancient Judaism and Christianity, medieval Islam did not forbid birth control as infanticide. Central to understanding birth control and family planning within Islam is an understanding of these Islamic justifications. The justification of birth control in Islam centered on a few important concepts.
First, the concept of “God’s infinite power” was used to justify the most commonly used method “coitus interruptus” (26). Accidental pregnancies that resulted from coitus interupptus were regarded as evidence of God’s all-powerful will—they proved that “when God wanted a child to be born, he was.” (26). Thus birth control was not regarded as infanticide, for if God wanted an infant he would be born, regardless what methods of birth control were employed (or attempted, rather). Additionally, the use of coitus interruptus has been documented in the Hadith. Mohammed is said to have practiced coitus interruptus and encouraged his followers to practice the method with women (often slaves) they did not wish to impregnate (15).
Interestingly, the prophet forbade the practice of coitus interruptus “with a free woman except with her permission” (16). Thus in accordance with the hadith, Islam requires a woman’s consent to practice coitus interruptus. Muslim scholars believed the woman is entitled to both sexual gratification and children—coitus interruptus without her permission is said to deny her of these (28).
Second, ancient Muslim scholars utilized both current medical and social knowledge to justify birth control and family planning. They believed that birth control could improve the well being of children. It was believed that a new pregnancy would almost certainly lead to death of a newborn infant (due to lack of breast milk, nutrition, etc). Birth control and family planning could improve the chances of those children that were already born. Additionally, ancient Muslims acknowledged that effective family planning could improve educational opportunities for children. Muslim scholar Bujairimi stated that “if contraception is practiced for an excuse, such as the raising of a child, it is not even blameworthy” (25). Thus, medieval Islam recognized the economic and social pressures put on large families, through that recognition justified birth control.
Finally, unlike in Christianity and Judaism the spilling of semen is not considered the spilling of God’s seed. Muslim scholars believed that both male and female semen were required for creation of life and both were believed (by many, including Ibyn Qayyim) to be equal in quality and value. It was believed that “the man’s semen is thick and forms the bones and tendomes. The woman’s semen is fine and forms the flesh and the blood” (52). Once life was generated ensoulment was believed to take one hundred twenty days. Thus, with both male and female contributions necessary to generate life and one hundred twenty days necessary , coitus interruptus did not carry the moral weight that it did in medieval Christianity and Judaism.
B.F Musallam continues to describe the various potions and herbs used in ancient Islamic societies as methods of birth control. He notes that only a small fraction of the described methods were “irrational” and claims that the early Islamic acceptance of birth control was related to relatively large body of scientific and medical knowledge on birth control available at the time.
Reflections
This book really helped me make sense of everything in my mind—now that I understand the ancient Islamic justifications for birth control it is easier to understand the modern justifications for birth control in the Islamic republic of Iran. I am impressed with the large body of scientific and medical knowledge available at that time and impressed Islam’s incorporation of that knowledge. I also find it interesting that Islam differed so widely from Christianity and Judaism in this regard (while I understand their religious justifications). Finally, I am surprised and impressed that a woman’s consent is required to practice coitus interruptus. This sort of goes against the modern stereotype of Muslim women as oppressed or without voice or rights; I think the belief in women’s right to sexual gratification would surprise many other people who are not familiar with Islam and Islamic family planning practices.
In writing my paper I see this book and my reading notes being a useful tool for analysis. Perhaps it would be wise to write my paper chronologically, starting with a the system before the revolution, documenting the changes after the revolution, and using data from this book to help analyze the justifications for why these changes/this new system was made.
Reading Notes on "Devices and Desires: Population Policy and Gender Roles in the Islamic Republic" by Homa Hoodfar
Hoodfar, Homa. “Devices and Desires: Population Policy and Gender Roles in the Islamic Republic”. Middle East Report, No. 190, Gender, Population, Environment (Sep.-Oct., 1994) pp.11-17
Homa Hoodfar begins her article with the bold claim that “the reproductive choices and strategies…are not decided by Islam but are the product of the political and economic realities of a given society” (11). Hoodfar believes that the Islamic Republic has shown considerable “adaptability” and “flexibility” in their ideologies to meet political, social, and more importantly, economic demands. Hoodfar begins her article in a similar way as she did her joint article with Samad Assadpour (“The Politics of Population Policy”—describing the history of the Iranian family planning program and the steps members of the Islamic Republic took to gain national consensus.
What is most interesting, however, is her discussion of “Women’s Status” “Contradictory Signals” and “Women’s Options.” Hoodfar notes the relatively recent improvements in women’s status that have come in conjunction with the family planning program, including increased education, improved health, and “enhanced social and economic security of all citizens.” (14) While the government has sought to improve female education (by opening fields like engineering to women, providing more opportunities in medicine, etc), they have sought to reduce women’s employment. Hoodfar describes the tactics the government has used to reduce women’s employment, including compulsory veiling, retirement packages after fifteen years of work, and full time pay for part time work (15). When these employment discouraged women do work, they hold only “three percent of senior government posts” yet remain on average more educated than their male counterparts(15). She points out the contradictions that these improvements have with the government’s promotion of female domesticity—they simply do not, she claims, reconcile well. (15)
Khomeni’s introduction of new family law also came with its contradictions. Under this new law women were afforded new rights, including the right to divorce if one’s husband takes on a second wife against the first wife’s will and the right to half of the wealth upon divorce (16). While women were afforded these rights in theory, they have meant little in practice. Many women remain married to men they would otherwise divorce because of rigid custody laws. (In roughly 65% of divorces the fathers are granted custody (16)). Additionally, few women are willing to divorce their husbands when “”woman’s opportunities in the second-marriage market are slim” (16) and a husband often reduces ones unpleasant dealings with the regime.
Hoodfar’s article brings up an intriguing and necessary question: what do these seemingly progressive policies mean if they carry little “practical significance” (16)?
Reflections
In complete honesty I am unsure how I feel about Hoodfar’s above statement (pg. 16). While I agree that these advances in women’s status that have come about via the family planning system may currently carry little practical significance, I don’t think they should be brushed aside for they hold potential for the future. Every advancement is a step forward, and no one can be sure of what that step will lead to. Attainment of birth control and the ability to control family size can and I think should be seen as a victory in itself.
While reading Hoodfar’s article I couldn’t help but draw the connections between Iran women’s employment struggles and American women’s similar employment struggles in my mind. While reading that few women who hold senior posts in the Iranian government, I thought to myself, how many women are in the United States Senate? And furthermore, how many women are CEO’s of big companies? Obviously women’s status in Iran and the United States are quite different, but it the similarities are also quite striking. I think it is important to recognize these similarities and realize that perhaps women’s status in Iran is not what it appears from an outside Western lens. Additionally, perhaps women’s status in the United States is not what it appears from an inner, Western lens.
Most of this article is mainly a recap of the chronology and development of the Iranian family planning system, similar to Hoodfar’s “The Politics of Population Policy.” It is however very useful and organized. I think it would be helpful to construct a timeline of all of the events that occurred—synthesizing dates and information from all my sources. From there I can compare overlap and reconcile contradictions. This will make writing the background portion of my paper much easier and likely much more accurate.
Homa Hoodfar begins her article with the bold claim that “the reproductive choices and strategies…are not decided by Islam but are the product of the political and economic realities of a given society” (11). Hoodfar believes that the Islamic Republic has shown considerable “adaptability” and “flexibility” in their ideologies to meet political, social, and more importantly, economic demands. Hoodfar begins her article in a similar way as she did her joint article with Samad Assadpour (“The Politics of Population Policy”—describing the history of the Iranian family planning program and the steps members of the Islamic Republic took to gain national consensus.
What is most interesting, however, is her discussion of “Women’s Status” “Contradictory Signals” and “Women’s Options.” Hoodfar notes the relatively recent improvements in women’s status that have come in conjunction with the family planning program, including increased education, improved health, and “enhanced social and economic security of all citizens.” (14) While the government has sought to improve female education (by opening fields like engineering to women, providing more opportunities in medicine, etc), they have sought to reduce women’s employment. Hoodfar describes the tactics the government has used to reduce women’s employment, including compulsory veiling, retirement packages after fifteen years of work, and full time pay for part time work (15). When these employment discouraged women do work, they hold only “three percent of senior government posts” yet remain on average more educated than their male counterparts(15). She points out the contradictions that these improvements have with the government’s promotion of female domesticity—they simply do not, she claims, reconcile well. (15)
Khomeni’s introduction of new family law also came with its contradictions. Under this new law women were afforded new rights, including the right to divorce if one’s husband takes on a second wife against the first wife’s will and the right to half of the wealth upon divorce (16). While women were afforded these rights in theory, they have meant little in practice. Many women remain married to men they would otherwise divorce because of rigid custody laws. (In roughly 65% of divorces the fathers are granted custody (16)). Additionally, few women are willing to divorce their husbands when “”woman’s opportunities in the second-marriage market are slim” (16) and a husband often reduces ones unpleasant dealings with the regime.
Hoodfar’s article brings up an intriguing and necessary question: what do these seemingly progressive policies mean if they carry little “practical significance” (16)?
Reflections
In complete honesty I am unsure how I feel about Hoodfar’s above statement (pg. 16). While I agree that these advances in women’s status that have come about via the family planning system may currently carry little practical significance, I don’t think they should be brushed aside for they hold potential for the future. Every advancement is a step forward, and no one can be sure of what that step will lead to. Attainment of birth control and the ability to control family size can and I think should be seen as a victory in itself.
While reading Hoodfar’s article I couldn’t help but draw the connections between Iran women’s employment struggles and American women’s similar employment struggles in my mind. While reading that few women who hold senior posts in the Iranian government, I thought to myself, how many women are in the United States Senate? And furthermore, how many women are CEO’s of big companies? Obviously women’s status in Iran and the United States are quite different, but it the similarities are also quite striking. I think it is important to recognize these similarities and realize that perhaps women’s status in Iran is not what it appears from an outside Western lens. Additionally, perhaps women’s status in the United States is not what it appears from an inner, Western lens.
Most of this article is mainly a recap of the chronology and development of the Iranian family planning system, similar to Hoodfar’s “The Politics of Population Policy.” It is however very useful and organized. I think it would be helpful to construct a timeline of all of the events that occurred—synthesizing dates and information from all my sources. From there I can compare overlap and reconcile contradictions. This will make writing the background portion of my paper much easier and likely much more accurate.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Readings Notes on "The Study of Muslim Women in the Middle East: Achievements and Remaining Problems" by Nikki R. Keddie
Keddie, Nikki R. The Study of Muslim Women in the Middle East: Achievements and Remaining Problems. Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 6 (2000-2001): 26-52
Keddie begins her article with a bold statement, claiming that Middle Eastern women’s studies has been marked with an “apologetic tone or tend to accentuate the positive while minimizing the negative” (25). To understand why Middle Eastern women’s history is written with such a tone, she looks to history for cues. Historically, the Middle East was feared by the West and Islam was seen by Christians as a “threatening, false religion” (27). These ideals continued and were perpetuated as Muslim women were viewed as “oppressed, sexually enslaved, miserable, or degenerate” (27). Muslim and Middle Eastern women were portrayed negatively and as needing help, a help only the West could provide. This western influence in many cases hurt Middle Eastern and Muslim women, and let to a reassertion of Islamic traditions and values (28). In these Islamic revivals women were gaining and claiming rights, and those writers focused on these gains while avoiding the negatives associated with these women’s status under Islamic regimes. In this way writing about Middle Eastern and Muslim women has become apologetic in many ways, as Keddie argues, and writers are afraid to criticize Islam.
In the years of 1970-2000, however, some criticisms of Islam and its effects on women’s rights did emerge, however. Many authors argued that the pre-Islamic societies were more gender equal than the Islamic societies (31). Since these criticisms emerged however, many scholars have attributed this reduce in egalitarianism to the creation of the state (31) and not to Islam. More recent works, Keddie states include“recognition of the variations in women’s status and roles by period, region, class…” (34). Thus, modern scholars seem to recognize that the variations in women’s status are not solely based on Islam, but on other socioeconomic factors too.
Keddie characterizes modern studies (from 1990 on) as consisting of an opposition between universalism and relativism. There are people like Azar Nafisi who believe reform is not possible in the clerical regime (45). Only time will tell if reform will come, and Keddie reminds the reader that any impediment upon reform “is not Islam but those who use its name to limit the rights of women” (40). Many relativists, on the contrary, use reinterpretations of Quranic scriptures to support women’s rights as in phase with an Islamic regime and culture. Keddie argues that taking one side of the argument doesn’t provide a convincing argument for either side. She writes that “a more nuanced perspective would see that the women’s roles and status at any stage of historical development reflect historical, social, and cultural circumstances, including class and gender systems that favor and are favored by those with power and wealth” (46). For a more accurate holistic analyses, both relativist and universalist perspectives must be considered, along with the social, economic, political, historical, etc systems that influence women’s status in particular cultures and lands at particular periods of time. Alone they are not enough, but together they may paint an accurate picture.
In her conclusion Keddie makes last crucial and very interesting point. In analyzing the cultural divide in Iranian society that many scholars have analyzed, that the upper class, educated, and secular portion of society is perceived and criticized as being Western. These Western practices “in the family, and elsewhere” (47) should not be viewed as mere imitation of the west. Rather, they should be viewed as changes in a culture that is evolving to fit new socioeconomic conditions and challenges—originating in the upper class, educated, secular elite but then emanating outwards to the rest of society. Westernization is not necessarily Western imitation, but rather may be a common response to similar socioeconomic challenges (ie. convergent evolution).
Reflections
Keddie’s article resonates with me as a sort of warning of what not to do in my analysis and research. By presenting what has been done in the past as what has worked well and what is lacking, a couple of themes have emerged:
1) I should try not to maintain an overly apologetic tone in criticizing Islam. One can criticize Islam in an academically beneficial way, and should not have to apologize for such criticisms.
2) I should try to maintain a balance between Universalism and Relativism, and analyze women’s status in a particular place and time as based on a conglomeration of factors—not scapegoat one.
3) I should avoid falling to the “Westernization” answer without merit. Just because something appears to be Western doesn’t mean it is an imitation of or imposition of Westernization. Common economic and social situations can lead to the evolution of common cultures (although these cultures are not likely to be in isolation from one another).
One very important book for me to read, as presented in Keddie’s article, is Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control Before the Nineteenth Century by Basim Musallam. Keddie describes this book as one that describes the use and practice with various methods of birth control and its tolerance under Islam. This is definitely a must read for my project.
Keddie begins her article with a bold statement, claiming that Middle Eastern women’s studies has been marked with an “apologetic tone or tend to accentuate the positive while minimizing the negative” (25). To understand why Middle Eastern women’s history is written with such a tone, she looks to history for cues. Historically, the Middle East was feared by the West and Islam was seen by Christians as a “threatening, false religion” (27). These ideals continued and were perpetuated as Muslim women were viewed as “oppressed, sexually enslaved, miserable, or degenerate” (27). Muslim and Middle Eastern women were portrayed negatively and as needing help, a help only the West could provide. This western influence in many cases hurt Middle Eastern and Muslim women, and let to a reassertion of Islamic traditions and values (28). In these Islamic revivals women were gaining and claiming rights, and those writers focused on these gains while avoiding the negatives associated with these women’s status under Islamic regimes. In this way writing about Middle Eastern and Muslim women has become apologetic in many ways, as Keddie argues, and writers are afraid to criticize Islam.
In the years of 1970-2000, however, some criticisms of Islam and its effects on women’s rights did emerge, however. Many authors argued that the pre-Islamic societies were more gender equal than the Islamic societies (31). Since these criticisms emerged however, many scholars have attributed this reduce in egalitarianism to the creation of the state (31) and not to Islam. More recent works, Keddie states include“recognition of the variations in women’s status and roles by period, region, class…” (34). Thus, modern scholars seem to recognize that the variations in women’s status are not solely based on Islam, but on other socioeconomic factors too.
Keddie characterizes modern studies (from 1990 on) as consisting of an opposition between universalism and relativism. There are people like Azar Nafisi who believe reform is not possible in the clerical regime (45). Only time will tell if reform will come, and Keddie reminds the reader that any impediment upon reform “is not Islam but those who use its name to limit the rights of women” (40). Many relativists, on the contrary, use reinterpretations of Quranic scriptures to support women’s rights as in phase with an Islamic regime and culture. Keddie argues that taking one side of the argument doesn’t provide a convincing argument for either side. She writes that “a more nuanced perspective would see that the women’s roles and status at any stage of historical development reflect historical, social, and cultural circumstances, including class and gender systems that favor and are favored by those with power and wealth” (46). For a more accurate holistic analyses, both relativist and universalist perspectives must be considered, along with the social, economic, political, historical, etc systems that influence women’s status in particular cultures and lands at particular periods of time. Alone they are not enough, but together they may paint an accurate picture.
In her conclusion Keddie makes last crucial and very interesting point. In analyzing the cultural divide in Iranian society that many scholars have analyzed, that the upper class, educated, and secular portion of society is perceived and criticized as being Western. These Western practices “in the family, and elsewhere” (47) should not be viewed as mere imitation of the west. Rather, they should be viewed as changes in a culture that is evolving to fit new socioeconomic conditions and challenges—originating in the upper class, educated, secular elite but then emanating outwards to the rest of society. Westernization is not necessarily Western imitation, but rather may be a common response to similar socioeconomic challenges (ie. convergent evolution).
Reflections
Keddie’s article resonates with me as a sort of warning of what not to do in my analysis and research. By presenting what has been done in the past as what has worked well and what is lacking, a couple of themes have emerged:
1) I should try not to maintain an overly apologetic tone in criticizing Islam. One can criticize Islam in an academically beneficial way, and should not have to apologize for such criticisms.
2) I should try to maintain a balance between Universalism and Relativism, and analyze women’s status in a particular place and time as based on a conglomeration of factors—not scapegoat one.
3) I should avoid falling to the “Westernization” answer without merit. Just because something appears to be Western doesn’t mean it is an imitation of or imposition of Westernization. Common economic and social situations can lead to the evolution of common cultures (although these cultures are not likely to be in isolation from one another).
One very important book for me to read, as presented in Keddie’s article, is Sex and Society in Islam: Birth Control Before the Nineteenth Century by Basim Musallam. Keddie describes this book as one that describes the use and practice with various methods of birth control and its tolerance under Islam. This is definitely a must read for my project.
Reading Notes on "The Politics of Population Policy" by S. Assadpour and H. Hoodfar
Assadpour, S. and Hoodfar, H. The Politics of Population Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies in Family planning. 31(2000), 19-34.
In the article from March of 2000 authors Homa Hoodfar and Samad Assadpour describe the elements and impetus that led Iranian political and religious leaders to revise their stance on birth control and contribute to the creation of one of the most successful family planning systems in the world.
Prior to the 1979 revolution Shah Reza Pahlavi enacted a family planning program, along with the “Family Protection Laws” (19). Interestingly, with access to birth control came some new legal rights, including the right to maintain custody of one’s children under certain circumstances and the right to resist polygamous relationships (the husband needed written permission from the first wife). With the implementation of the Shah’s family planning program women were also encouraged to join the workforce (20).
This “Western” family planning program was criticized by religious leaders in Iran, particularly Ayatalloh Khomeini. Many religious leaders spoke against it openly in Friday sermons, claiming that family planning was simply a Western scheme to reduce the number of Muslim soldiers. They denounced family planning as haram, although traditionally Islam did not prohibit contraception. Some years later after extensive discussion a group of religious leaders decided that Islam did not forbid contraceptives, however use of contraceptives was not encouraged and after the 1979 revolution there was no government policy or program regarding family planning/the reduction of births.
While the Shah’s policies had been seen as favoring the urban rich, the Islamic Republic tried to provide the urban and rural poor (initially, their supporters) with basic needs. The Islamic Republic set out to provide government funded basic food, health care, and education. Although this undertaking was incredibly expensive the regime saw it as important to serve their people and also their supporters in the revolution (21). With the rising population government funded schools became very crowded, and soon the Budget and Planning Organization saw that the government could not continue to provide such resources for its ever growing population. Those supporting a government family planning policy tried to garner support through the print media—they wanted to get the public talking about the issue.
To frame the issue in a way that Islamic religious leaders would accept, supporters of a family planning program did not present a potential program as existing solely for the purpose of birth control and reducing births. Rather, they tried to educate religious leaders on the current population issue and leave the moral/ethical decisions for the religious leaders. Iranian religious leaders decided there was nothing in Islamic scripture regarding birth control and the choice to limit children. Religious leaders presented the program in terms of a necessary fix—if the regime were to continue provide basic services to its people population could not continue to grow. It was a policy of “crisis management”, and not development (24).
Thus, in contrary to the Shah’s “Western” family planning system, an “Islamic” family planning system was born. This family system emphasized choice—if a woman wanted to have six children it was her choice, just as it was her choice to limit births. This Islamic family planning system approved birth control methods like the birth control pill, IUDs, and condoms, but limited norplant and sterilization to couples with three of more kids or over the age of 30 (26). Women were informed about the benefits and risks of each method publically via print media and radio, and encouraged to make the choice that was best for them. It was an full scale family planning program in that it also helped families with difficulty conceiving (the government invested in artificial insemination) (25). The goal of Iran’s family planning program was officially “the prevention of unwanted pregnancies in order for families to improve their physical and social health” (25).
Religious leaders in Iran legitimized the program by claiming birth control was initially a Muslim study, not a Western one, claiming that “the concern about population has preoccupied Muslim scholars long before it was discussed in the West” (28). They also justified the family planning policy by claiming that the government should seek to create healthy happy moral Muslims, and be less concerned with sheer numbers. It is more difficult, the regime claimed, to raise these Muslims in crowded families where there is little attention from family members (28).
One way the regime dispersed information on the family planning policy was via volunteer female community health workers. These community health workers receive basic training on health information, facilitate discussions, distribute health information, and monitor around fifty patients each. As of 1999, there were 41,000 recorded volunteers (30). This practice has been incredibly successful, with the volunteers gaining leadership skills and self confidence while educating their fellow women. The work of these female volunteer workers, combined with the collective efforts of political and religious leaders, has led to an immense reduction in the fertility rate. The fertility rate dropped from 5.6 births per women to 3.3 births per women from 1986 to 1995.
Iran’s family planning program is one that is quite distinct. Religious and political leaders gathered to create a system that in line with both Islam and the economic and social needs of the nation. Furthermore, the regime was able to legitimize family planning as an Islamic institution, and one that would better create happy, healthy, and moral soldiers for Islam. This system, it seems, is uniquely Iranian.
Reflections
Hoodfar and Assadpour’s article is an excellent summary on the history of the Iranian family planning program and the Islamic justifications that supported the program. However, it seems as if some pieces of the puzzle are missing:
1) What happened in the discussions/debates in which contraceptives went from being haram to acceptable under Islam? Was the impetus for that change based on economic woes from the regime trying to support its large scale social programs?
2) What happened to the 1980 Fatwa that Pardis Mahdavi wrote about in Passionate Uprisings?
3) Also, notably missing is any mention of unmarried women excluded under the family planning system. What level of education do these women have regarding birth control and family planning? Can they at all slip through the cracks and get access to information and services or do they go without? What is the status of their sexual health?
This article also has a couple of excellent graphs, something to keep in mind for the creation of my final paper.
In the article from March of 2000 authors Homa Hoodfar and Samad Assadpour describe the elements and impetus that led Iranian political and religious leaders to revise their stance on birth control and contribute to the creation of one of the most successful family planning systems in the world.
Prior to the 1979 revolution Shah Reza Pahlavi enacted a family planning program, along with the “Family Protection Laws” (19). Interestingly, with access to birth control came some new legal rights, including the right to maintain custody of one’s children under certain circumstances and the right to resist polygamous relationships (the husband needed written permission from the first wife). With the implementation of the Shah’s family planning program women were also encouraged to join the workforce (20).
This “Western” family planning program was criticized by religious leaders in Iran, particularly Ayatalloh Khomeini. Many religious leaders spoke against it openly in Friday sermons, claiming that family planning was simply a Western scheme to reduce the number of Muslim soldiers. They denounced family planning as haram, although traditionally Islam did not prohibit contraception. Some years later after extensive discussion a group of religious leaders decided that Islam did not forbid contraceptives, however use of contraceptives was not encouraged and after the 1979 revolution there was no government policy or program regarding family planning/the reduction of births.
While the Shah’s policies had been seen as favoring the urban rich, the Islamic Republic tried to provide the urban and rural poor (initially, their supporters) with basic needs. The Islamic Republic set out to provide government funded basic food, health care, and education. Although this undertaking was incredibly expensive the regime saw it as important to serve their people and also their supporters in the revolution (21). With the rising population government funded schools became very crowded, and soon the Budget and Planning Organization saw that the government could not continue to provide such resources for its ever growing population. Those supporting a government family planning policy tried to garner support through the print media—they wanted to get the public talking about the issue.
To frame the issue in a way that Islamic religious leaders would accept, supporters of a family planning program did not present a potential program as existing solely for the purpose of birth control and reducing births. Rather, they tried to educate religious leaders on the current population issue and leave the moral/ethical decisions for the religious leaders. Iranian religious leaders decided there was nothing in Islamic scripture regarding birth control and the choice to limit children. Religious leaders presented the program in terms of a necessary fix—if the regime were to continue provide basic services to its people population could not continue to grow. It was a policy of “crisis management”, and not development (24).
Thus, in contrary to the Shah’s “Western” family planning system, an “Islamic” family planning system was born. This family system emphasized choice—if a woman wanted to have six children it was her choice, just as it was her choice to limit births. This Islamic family planning system approved birth control methods like the birth control pill, IUDs, and condoms, but limited norplant and sterilization to couples with three of more kids or over the age of 30 (26). Women were informed about the benefits and risks of each method publically via print media and radio, and encouraged to make the choice that was best for them. It was an full scale family planning program in that it also helped families with difficulty conceiving (the government invested in artificial insemination) (25). The goal of Iran’s family planning program was officially “the prevention of unwanted pregnancies in order for families to improve their physical and social health” (25).
Religious leaders in Iran legitimized the program by claiming birth control was initially a Muslim study, not a Western one, claiming that “the concern about population has preoccupied Muslim scholars long before it was discussed in the West” (28). They also justified the family planning policy by claiming that the government should seek to create healthy happy moral Muslims, and be less concerned with sheer numbers. It is more difficult, the regime claimed, to raise these Muslims in crowded families where there is little attention from family members (28).
One way the regime dispersed information on the family planning policy was via volunteer female community health workers. These community health workers receive basic training on health information, facilitate discussions, distribute health information, and monitor around fifty patients each. As of 1999, there were 41,000 recorded volunteers (30). This practice has been incredibly successful, with the volunteers gaining leadership skills and self confidence while educating their fellow women. The work of these female volunteer workers, combined with the collective efforts of political and religious leaders, has led to an immense reduction in the fertility rate. The fertility rate dropped from 5.6 births per women to 3.3 births per women from 1986 to 1995.
Iran’s family planning program is one that is quite distinct. Religious and political leaders gathered to create a system that in line with both Islam and the economic and social needs of the nation. Furthermore, the regime was able to legitimize family planning as an Islamic institution, and one that would better create happy, healthy, and moral soldiers for Islam. This system, it seems, is uniquely Iranian.
Reflections
Hoodfar and Assadpour’s article is an excellent summary on the history of the Iranian family planning program and the Islamic justifications that supported the program. However, it seems as if some pieces of the puzzle are missing:
1) What happened in the discussions/debates in which contraceptives went from being haram to acceptable under Islam? Was the impetus for that change based on economic woes from the regime trying to support its large scale social programs?
2) What happened to the 1980 Fatwa that Pardis Mahdavi wrote about in Passionate Uprisings?
3) Also, notably missing is any mention of unmarried women excluded under the family planning system. What level of education do these women have regarding birth control and family planning? Can they at all slip through the cracks and get access to information and services or do they go without? What is the status of their sexual health?
This article also has a couple of excellent graphs, something to keep in mind for the creation of my final paper.
Readings Notes on "Passionate Uprisings" by Pardis Mahdavi
Mahdavi, Pardis. Passionate Uprisings. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California. 2009
In her 2009 book Passionate Uprisings, Pardis Mahdvi argues that a sexual revolution occurred in Iran during her years of study, from 2000 to 2007. This sexual revolution, Mahdavi argues, began with the middle to upper class secular and educated youth of Tehran (but has spread to the urban and rural popular classes and beyond age demographic of the “children of the Revolution”). This particular cross section of society is unsatisfied with the government and has the time and tools necessary to express their dissatisfaction. Highly educated (from the Islamic republic’s free education system) but lacking adequate employment opportunities, these youth have sufficient free time to channel towards speaking against the regime, even if that “speech” isn’t necessarily verbal.
In speaking out against the regime, this particular demographic of youth employed many nonverbal tactics. Young men and women challenged the regime in their dress. By wearing ever shortening tight mantos, bleach blond locks of hair poking out of a rusari, pounds of makeup, open toed shoes, nail polish and capris young women in Iran are actively speaking out again the regime and the Islamic dress code imposed upon them (63). Young men do the same by wearing tight clothing, having Western style gelled hair, and un-Islamic clean shaven faces. Author Pardis Mahdavi argues that this outwardly appearing hedonistic youth culture is really a statement against the regime; it is way to express one’s self and push for small changes.
These youth also spoke against the regime through their internet. With Persian as the fourth most used language in the “internet blogosphere” (77), many young Tehrani’s are speaking against the regime through their blogs. The relative autonomy of the internet allowed these youth to express their dissatisfaction against the regime in a semi-private space, more free from harassment. The internet also allowed for dating, chatting with friends, and planning of the infamous north Tehran parties. With a lot of money at their disposal, this wealthy north Tehrani’s planned elaborate parties, complete with alcohol, drugs, and the occasional sex orgy. Getting arrested at these parties is quite the norm, but seen by many as a triumph against the regime. One of Mahdavi’s informants even went as far as to say that “she almost dares them [the komite] to catch her, because that means she and her groups of friends are succeeding… ‘the fact they are […] wanting to bug us more means we’re getting under their skin, means we’re doing something right!’” (196).
Through this sexual revolution, Mahdavi argues that the youth of Tehran, and of Iran, are making headway against the regime. Brightly colored rusari’s are now, in some parts of Tehran, the norm. Women that were once harassed for certain style choices now wear them without any bother. Additionally with arrest and punishments for partying becoming the norm and declining in severity, young people in Tehran no longer fear the komite as they once did (namely, just after the Revolution). As fear of the regime continues to decline, young people in Iran will only continue to push, and as they push they will gain more ground. What was once a relationship solely of fear between the youth of Iran and the Islamic Republic is now a relationship of fear mixed with antsy dissatisfaction—it is a tug of war between the youth and the state. In time the regime will be forced to concede some to the youth. These concessions may be small, an inch of rusari pushed back perhaps, or less frequent physical punishment for partygoers, but they concessions and gains for the Tehrani and Iranian youth nonetheless.
Reflections
Pardis Mahdavi’s novel, while incredibly interesting and entertaining, perpetuates the notion of Iran as a place of extremes. Instead of studying the Iranian demographic extreme one may expect from the outside (the highly conservative Muslim demographic, with women donning long black chadors), Mahdavi studies the wealthy, secular, educated elite of north Tehran. What is missing from her analysis is the middle of these two extremes. Where do the majority of Iranian citizens fall along this continuum? It will be important to keep this in mind in my research, and try not to focus too much on the eye catching extremes that I ignore the conditions and lives of most Iranians.
Her sixth chapter “High Risk” details the dangerous sexual choices many young Tehrani’s regularly make, including unprotected and multiple partner sex. She speaks of Iran’s highly successful family planning program, but notes that the unmarried and often very sexually active are left out. This chapter was the impetus to help narrow and define my project. I will study the effects of the family planning program, and include my focus on these women who were left out. What kind of sexual health and family planning options exist for them, and how has their exclusion from the government’s family planning program affected their lives? Mahdavi’s visits to family planning classes, gynecology clinics, and the black market of abortion pills behind the mosque near Bazaar Tajrish will give good ideas for places to start out.
In her 2009 book Passionate Uprisings, Pardis Mahdvi argues that a sexual revolution occurred in Iran during her years of study, from 2000 to 2007. This sexual revolution, Mahdavi argues, began with the middle to upper class secular and educated youth of Tehran (but has spread to the urban and rural popular classes and beyond age demographic of the “children of the Revolution”). This particular cross section of society is unsatisfied with the government and has the time and tools necessary to express their dissatisfaction. Highly educated (from the Islamic republic’s free education system) but lacking adequate employment opportunities, these youth have sufficient free time to channel towards speaking against the regime, even if that “speech” isn’t necessarily verbal.
In speaking out against the regime, this particular demographic of youth employed many nonverbal tactics. Young men and women challenged the regime in their dress. By wearing ever shortening tight mantos, bleach blond locks of hair poking out of a rusari, pounds of makeup, open toed shoes, nail polish and capris young women in Iran are actively speaking out again the regime and the Islamic dress code imposed upon them (63). Young men do the same by wearing tight clothing, having Western style gelled hair, and un-Islamic clean shaven faces. Author Pardis Mahdavi argues that this outwardly appearing hedonistic youth culture is really a statement against the regime; it is way to express one’s self and push for small changes.
These youth also spoke against the regime through their internet. With Persian as the fourth most used language in the “internet blogosphere” (77), many young Tehrani’s are speaking against the regime through their blogs. The relative autonomy of the internet allowed these youth to express their dissatisfaction against the regime in a semi-private space, more free from harassment. The internet also allowed for dating, chatting with friends, and planning of the infamous north Tehran parties. With a lot of money at their disposal, this wealthy north Tehrani’s planned elaborate parties, complete with alcohol, drugs, and the occasional sex orgy. Getting arrested at these parties is quite the norm, but seen by many as a triumph against the regime. One of Mahdavi’s informants even went as far as to say that “she almost dares them [the komite] to catch her, because that means she and her groups of friends are succeeding… ‘the fact they are […] wanting to bug us more means we’re getting under their skin, means we’re doing something right!’” (196).
Through this sexual revolution, Mahdavi argues that the youth of Tehran, and of Iran, are making headway against the regime. Brightly colored rusari’s are now, in some parts of Tehran, the norm. Women that were once harassed for certain style choices now wear them without any bother. Additionally with arrest and punishments for partying becoming the norm and declining in severity, young people in Tehran no longer fear the komite as they once did (namely, just after the Revolution). As fear of the regime continues to decline, young people in Iran will only continue to push, and as they push they will gain more ground. What was once a relationship solely of fear between the youth of Iran and the Islamic Republic is now a relationship of fear mixed with antsy dissatisfaction—it is a tug of war between the youth and the state. In time the regime will be forced to concede some to the youth. These concessions may be small, an inch of rusari pushed back perhaps, or less frequent physical punishment for partygoers, but they concessions and gains for the Tehrani and Iranian youth nonetheless.
Reflections
Pardis Mahdavi’s novel, while incredibly interesting and entertaining, perpetuates the notion of Iran as a place of extremes. Instead of studying the Iranian demographic extreme one may expect from the outside (the highly conservative Muslim demographic, with women donning long black chadors), Mahdavi studies the wealthy, secular, educated elite of north Tehran. What is missing from her analysis is the middle of these two extremes. Where do the majority of Iranian citizens fall along this continuum? It will be important to keep this in mind in my research, and try not to focus too much on the eye catching extremes that I ignore the conditions and lives of most Iranians.
Her sixth chapter “High Risk” details the dangerous sexual choices many young Tehrani’s regularly make, including unprotected and multiple partner sex. She speaks of Iran’s highly successful family planning program, but notes that the unmarried and often very sexually active are left out. This chapter was the impetus to help narrow and define my project. I will study the effects of the family planning program, and include my focus on these women who were left out. What kind of sexual health and family planning options exist for them, and how has their exclusion from the government’s family planning program affected their lives? Mahdavi’s visits to family planning classes, gynecology clinics, and the black market of abortion pills behind the mosque near Bazaar Tajrish will give good ideas for places to start out.
Readings Notes on "Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate" by V.Moghadam
Moghadam, Valentine M. Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate. Signs: Journal of Women and Culture in Society (2002): 1136-1171
In her 2002 article eloquent scholar Valentine Moghadam analyzes both major schools of thought regarding Islamic feminist. She asks, as many do, if Islamic feminism truly can exist. Can we use the term Islamic feminist to describe the “veiled women, who carry out their work toward women’s advancement and gender equality within an Islamic discursive framework” (1136)?After giving a brief background of the 1979 Iranian Revolution Moghadam presents both arguments.
The first argument, supported by scholars like Afsaneh Najmabadi, Nayereh Tohidi, and Ziba Mir-Hosseini is the idea that there are possibilities for advancements upon women’s status within Islam. Najmabadi in particular praises Islamic feminism for its ability to “open up dialogue between religious and secular feminists” (1143). Islamic feminism, she claims, gives a common ground for discussion and negotiation, and Islamic feminists are open to the discourse of so called Western feminism. Many Islamic feminists maintain Islamic beliefs and use specific quoranic verses to support advancements in women’s status (1147). This working within the religious framework seems crucial to gain ground within the Islamic Republic. However, as feminist laywer Kar rights “interpretation of religious laws should not be considered an alternative to secular and democratic demands, but as a component of a more holistic social change” (1147). Thus it appears that demands for the advancement of women’s status through a quoranic argument are good, but they are not enough. They must be presented in tandem with secular demands and the notion of certain universal rights.
Those who disagree with Islamic feminism say that feminism simply cannot be operated within an Islamic framework. They claim that Islamic feminism is a compromise and the status of women cannot improve with the Islamic Republic in power. Studying Islamic feminism, they claim, clouds the fact that Islam in Iran is not a choice a religion that is imposed upon by the government (1148). Many even go as far as to say that writing about Islamic feminism is “inaccurate” and “irresponsible” (1148) only increases the legitimacy of the theocracy in Iran. For opponents of Islamic feminism, the only way “real change—real democratization—will come about [is] outside of the religious framework” (1151). For them, Islam and feminism are simply incompatible.
An interesting, unknown term that comes up in the article (although the definition is sort of implied from the name) is “bargaining with the patriarchy.” From scholar Deniz Kandiyoti, this term sparks interesting thoughts. It seems to me like it speaks of working within the system—recognizing that the system is not ideal and while it cannot be currently overthrown, one can make small gains within its framework. This term seems in line with the concept of Islamic feminism, a feminism that does not have to contradict the social and religious framework.
Moghadam’s personal opinion seems like an astute compromise between the two. Claims for female advancements made within an Islamic context are important, for one should “use what you need to [to advance women’s positions]” (1152). They are however, not enough. With ever changing interpretations of the Quran, secular advancements are needed to ensure women make and maintain headway. Moghdam claims that two main changes need to be made in Iran for real feminist advances to occur. First, the government and mosque should be separated—laws should not be based on religious scripts (1163). Second, she thinks that all citizens should be equal in the eyes of the government (1163). In the meantime however, Moghadam notes that it seems silly for one group of feminists to attack another. Such attacks are not productive to the goals of either group. If feminism is as she claims based on “being and doing” (1164) then “Islamic feminism is one feminism among many” (1165)
Reflections
I find Moghadam’s astute and balanced argument very refreshing. Her tone was not the apologetic tone that Keddie wrote of in her review articles, but critical and analytical. Valentine Moghadam views Islamic feminism from a results based perspective. Quranic reinterpretation leads to results—therefore it is valid to a point. Quranic reinterpretation can only go so far however, and other secular claims must be made.
It seems silly to me for scholars to renounce Islamic feminism, in fact, I don’t see the point. If women can make claims and advance their status under the name of Islam, it seems like a positive thing. The notion that using Islamic reinterpretation as justification hurts secular movements seems to ignore the current needs of women in hopes of a secular regime that may never come. Regardless, The Islamic Republic will not become the Secular Republic over night, and in the meantime women should use whatever means of advancement they have to advance their status. Islam and feminism do not, in my opinion, have to be mutually exclusive. Perhaps Islamic feminism is a first step towards a secular more encompassing feminism for Iran.
In her 2002 article eloquent scholar Valentine Moghadam analyzes both major schools of thought regarding Islamic feminist. She asks, as many do, if Islamic feminism truly can exist. Can we use the term Islamic feminist to describe the “veiled women, who carry out their work toward women’s advancement and gender equality within an Islamic discursive framework” (1136)?After giving a brief background of the 1979 Iranian Revolution Moghadam presents both arguments.
The first argument, supported by scholars like Afsaneh Najmabadi, Nayereh Tohidi, and Ziba Mir-Hosseini is the idea that there are possibilities for advancements upon women’s status within Islam. Najmabadi in particular praises Islamic feminism for its ability to “open up dialogue between religious and secular feminists” (1143). Islamic feminism, she claims, gives a common ground for discussion and negotiation, and Islamic feminists are open to the discourse of so called Western feminism. Many Islamic feminists maintain Islamic beliefs and use specific quoranic verses to support advancements in women’s status (1147). This working within the religious framework seems crucial to gain ground within the Islamic Republic. However, as feminist laywer Kar rights “interpretation of religious laws should not be considered an alternative to secular and democratic demands, but as a component of a more holistic social change” (1147). Thus it appears that demands for the advancement of women’s status through a quoranic argument are good, but they are not enough. They must be presented in tandem with secular demands and the notion of certain universal rights.
Those who disagree with Islamic feminism say that feminism simply cannot be operated within an Islamic framework. They claim that Islamic feminism is a compromise and the status of women cannot improve with the Islamic Republic in power. Studying Islamic feminism, they claim, clouds the fact that Islam in Iran is not a choice a religion that is imposed upon by the government (1148). Many even go as far as to say that writing about Islamic feminism is “inaccurate” and “irresponsible” (1148) only increases the legitimacy of the theocracy in Iran. For opponents of Islamic feminism, the only way “real change—real democratization—will come about [is] outside of the religious framework” (1151). For them, Islam and feminism are simply incompatible.
An interesting, unknown term that comes up in the article (although the definition is sort of implied from the name) is “bargaining with the patriarchy.” From scholar Deniz Kandiyoti, this term sparks interesting thoughts. It seems to me like it speaks of working within the system—recognizing that the system is not ideal and while it cannot be currently overthrown, one can make small gains within its framework. This term seems in line with the concept of Islamic feminism, a feminism that does not have to contradict the social and religious framework.
Moghadam’s personal opinion seems like an astute compromise between the two. Claims for female advancements made within an Islamic context are important, for one should “use what you need to [to advance women’s positions]” (1152). They are however, not enough. With ever changing interpretations of the Quran, secular advancements are needed to ensure women make and maintain headway. Moghdam claims that two main changes need to be made in Iran for real feminist advances to occur. First, the government and mosque should be separated—laws should not be based on religious scripts (1163). Second, she thinks that all citizens should be equal in the eyes of the government (1163). In the meantime however, Moghadam notes that it seems silly for one group of feminists to attack another. Such attacks are not productive to the goals of either group. If feminism is as she claims based on “being and doing” (1164) then “Islamic feminism is one feminism among many” (1165)
Reflections
I find Moghadam’s astute and balanced argument very refreshing. Her tone was not the apologetic tone that Keddie wrote of in her review articles, but critical and analytical. Valentine Moghadam views Islamic feminism from a results based perspective. Quranic reinterpretation leads to results—therefore it is valid to a point. Quranic reinterpretation can only go so far however, and other secular claims must be made.
It seems silly to me for scholars to renounce Islamic feminism, in fact, I don’t see the point. If women can make claims and advance their status under the name of Islam, it seems like a positive thing. The notion that using Islamic reinterpretation as justification hurts secular movements seems to ignore the current needs of women in hopes of a secular regime that may never come. Regardless, The Islamic Republic will not become the Secular Republic over night, and in the meantime women should use whatever means of advancement they have to advance their status. Islam and feminism do not, in my opinion, have to be mutually exclusive. Perhaps Islamic feminism is a first step towards a secular more encompassing feminism for Iran.
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