Reading Notes on "The Politics of Population Policy" by S. Assadpour and H. Hoodfar

Assadpour, S. and Hoodfar, H. The Politics of Population Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies in Family planning. 31(2000), 19-34.

In the article from March of 2000 authors Homa Hoodfar and Samad Assadpour describe the elements and impetus that led Iranian political and religious leaders to revise their stance on birth control and contribute to the creation of one of the most successful family planning systems in the world.

Prior to the 1979 revolution Shah Reza Pahlavi enacted a family planning program, along with the “Family Protection Laws” (19). Interestingly, with access to birth control came some new legal rights, including the right to maintain custody of one’s children under certain circumstances and the right to resist polygamous relationships (the husband needed written permission from the first wife). With the implementation of the Shah’s family planning program women were also encouraged to join the workforce (20).

This “Western” family planning program was criticized by religious leaders in Iran, particularly Ayatalloh Khomeini. Many religious leaders spoke against it openly in Friday sermons, claiming that family planning was simply a Western scheme to reduce the number of Muslim soldiers. They denounced family planning as haram, although traditionally Islam did not prohibit contraception. Some years later after extensive discussion a group of religious leaders decided that Islam did not forbid contraceptives, however use of contraceptives was not encouraged and after the 1979 revolution there was no government policy or program regarding family planning/the reduction of births.

While the Shah’s policies had been seen as favoring the urban rich, the Islamic Republic tried to provide the urban and rural poor (initially, their supporters) with basic needs. The Islamic Republic set out to provide government funded basic food, health care, and education. Although this undertaking was incredibly expensive the regime saw it as important to serve their people and also their supporters in the revolution (21). With the rising population government funded schools became very crowded, and soon the Budget and Planning Organization saw that the government could not continue to provide such resources for its ever growing population. Those supporting a government family planning policy tried to garner support through the print media—they wanted to get the public talking about the issue.

To frame the issue in a way that Islamic religious leaders would accept, supporters of a family planning program did not present a potential program as existing solely for the purpose of birth control and reducing births. Rather, they tried to educate religious leaders on the current population issue and leave the moral/ethical decisions for the religious leaders. Iranian religious leaders decided there was nothing in Islamic scripture regarding birth control and the choice to limit children. Religious leaders presented the program in terms of a necessary fix—if the regime were to continue provide basic services to its people population could not continue to grow. It was a policy of “crisis management”, and not development (24).

Thus, in contrary to the Shah’s “Western” family planning system, an “Islamic” family planning system was born. This family system emphasized choice—if a woman wanted to have six children it was her choice, just as it was her choice to limit births. This Islamic family planning system approved birth control methods like the birth control pill, IUDs, and condoms, but limited norplant and sterilization to couples with three of more kids or over the age of 30 (26). Women were informed about the benefits and risks of each method publically via print media and radio, and encouraged to make the choice that was best for them. It was an full scale family planning program in that it also helped families with difficulty conceiving (the government invested in artificial insemination) (25). The goal of Iran’s family planning program was officially “the prevention of unwanted pregnancies in order for families to improve their physical and social health” (25).

Religious leaders in Iran legitimized the program by claiming birth control was initially a Muslim study, not a Western one, claiming that “the concern about population has preoccupied Muslim scholars long before it was discussed in the West” (28). They also justified the family planning policy by claiming that the government should seek to create healthy happy moral Muslims, and be less concerned with sheer numbers. It is more difficult, the regime claimed, to raise these Muslims in crowded families where there is little attention from family members (28).

One way the regime dispersed information on the family planning policy was via volunteer female community health workers. These community health workers receive basic training on health information, facilitate discussions, distribute health information, and monitor around fifty patients each. As of 1999, there were 41,000 recorded volunteers (30). This practice has been incredibly successful, with the volunteers gaining leadership skills and self confidence while educating their fellow women. The work of these female volunteer workers, combined with the collective efforts of political and religious leaders, has led to an immense reduction in the fertility rate. The fertility rate dropped from 5.6 births per women to 3.3 births per women from 1986 to 1995.

Iran’s family planning program is one that is quite distinct. Religious and political leaders gathered to create a system that in line with both Islam and the economic and social needs of the nation. Furthermore, the regime was able to legitimize family planning as an Islamic institution, and one that would better create happy, healthy, and moral soldiers for Islam. This system, it seems, is uniquely Iranian.

Reflections
Hoodfar and Assadpour’s article is an excellent summary on the history of the Iranian family planning program and the Islamic justifications that supported the program. However, it seems as if some pieces of the puzzle are missing:
1) What happened in the discussions/debates in which contraceptives went from being haram to acceptable under Islam? Was the impetus for that change based on economic woes from the regime trying to support its large scale social programs?
2) What happened to the 1980 Fatwa that Pardis Mahdavi wrote about in Passionate Uprisings?
3) Also, notably missing is any mention of unmarried women excluded under the family planning system. What level of education do these women have regarding birth control and family planning? Can they at all slip through the cracks and get access to information and services or do they go without? What is the status of their sexual health?

This article also has a couple of excellent graphs, something to keep in mind for the creation of my final paper.